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TAKING ORDERS FROM TWEETS: REDEFINING THE
FIRST AMENDMENT BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE
SPEECH IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Sara Swartzwelder*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the designers of Twitter were choosing a cute little
bird as their logo 1 and drafting their terms of service, 2 it is
doubtful that they had the faintest idea that they were creating a
platform for declarations of war. On September 23, 2017,
President Trump tweeted that if North Korea’s Foreign Minister
“echoes thoughts of Little Rocket Man, they won’t be around
much longer!”3 Two days later, Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho
stated that President Donald Trump had declared war on North
Korea.4 Although the White House insisted that the notion was
“absurd,”5 North Korea’s reading of the tweet is hardly patently
unreasonable under the circumstances. While the not-so-veiled
threat in Trump’s tweet may not legally constitute a formal
declaration of war, the mere fact that it was made by a sitting
*

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law; Staff
Member, First Amendment Law Review.
1
“[W]e came across the word ‘twitter,’ and it was just perfect. The definition was ‘a
short burst of inconsequential information’ . . . . And that’s exactly what the product
was.” David Sarno, Twitter Creator Jack Dorsey Illuminates the Site’s Founding Document.
Part I, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009, 5:04 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/02/twitter-creator.html (quoting
Jack Dorsey during a 2009 interview discussing Twitter’s origins as an internal
messaging system inspired by the “status” function of Instant Messenger); Joshua
Johnson, Twitter’s New Logo: The Geometry and Evolution of Our Favorite Bird, DESIGN
SHACK (June 11, 2012), https://designshack.net/articles/graphics/twitters-newlogo-the-geometry-and-evolution-of-our-favorite-bird/; TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/.
2
Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited May 5,
2018).
3
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 23, 2017, 8:08 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/911789314169823232. “Little Rocket
Man” is a demeaning epithet used by Donald Trump to refer to North Korean leader
Kim Jong-un. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2017,
8:25 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/936209447747190784?ref_src=twsrc
%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.latimes.com%2Fpolitics%2Fla-polupdates-everything-president-trump-calls-kim-jong-un-little-rocket-1512093131htmlstory.html&tfw_creator=latimes&tfw_site=latimes; Adam Edelman et al, Where
Did Trump’s Use of ‘Rocket Man’ Come From?, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:47 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/where-did-trump-s-use-rocketman-come-n802681.
4
Alexander Smith & Abigail Williams, White House Rejects N. Korean Claim That
Trump ‘Declared War,’ NBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:58 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korean-foreign-minister-saystrump-has-declared-war-n804501.
5
Id.
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U.S. President gives the words themselves significant power—
and much higher stakes. North Korean Foreign Minister Yongho emphasized that very point: “[e]ven the fact that this comes
from someone who is currently holding the seat of the U.S.
presidency is clearly a declaration of war.” 6 The response of
North Korean officials7 makes clear the potential danger of such
a statement. Even if Trump did not intend, or did not have an
eye toward, its possible consequences, it does not lessen the
implications of seeing the prospect of war arise out of a remark
made on Twitter.
“Twitter wars” are usually petty feuds between
celebrities,8 but incidents like this one have brought speech on
Twitter to the forefront of our national—and global—dialogue
and thrown into sharp relief the possible necessity of according a
greater level of seriousness to social media speech, especially
when made by a sitting President. The fast-escalating battery of
heated insults and threats between Trump and North Korean
leader Kim Jong-un mirrors the tactics that Trump used
throughout the 2016 Republican primaries and his presidential
campaign,9 but this Twitter war may have a real war waiting in
the wings. A potentially incendiary tweet from a U.S. President,
open to interpretation with all the world watching, could lead to
any number of different actions or reactions—“the [P]resident[]’s
words alone force the U.S. national security community to focus
on nuclear weapons.”10 Unlike any other speaker in the United
States, the President’s words can be taken as provoking or even
formally initiating an international conflict.11 And not without
cause: the words of a sitting president have the whole arsenal of
6

Id.
Joe Sterling et al., North Korea Official: Trump on Suicide Mission. Trump Tweets
Response, CNN (Sept. 24, 2017, 6:02 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/23/asia/north-korea-seismic-activity/index.html;
North Korea Calls Trump Tweet “a Declaration of War,” CBS NEWS (Sept. 25, 2017,
8:13PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-trump-statementdeclaration-of-war-live-updates/.
8
See Olivia Wilson, 10 of the Most Intense Celebrity Twitter Wars of All Time, CLEVVER
(Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.clevver.com/celebrity-twitter-feuds/; Maria Yagoda,
The Craziest Celeb Feuds to Ever Take Place on Twitter, PEOPLE (May 3, 2017, 1:01 PM),
http://people.com/celebrity/kanye-west-wiz-khalifa-tweets-celebrity-twitterfeuds/azealia-vs-iggy.
9
Z. Byron Wolf, Presidential Name-Calling: What ‘Little Marco’ Has To Do with ‘Rocket
Man’ (and Nuclear Weapons), CNN (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:10 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/23/politics/presidential-name-calling/index.html
(noting that Trump used insulting nicknames towards his political opponents “both
on Twitter and at campaign rallies . . . to build support among the faithful” and to
emphasize that “his opponent was flawed—and that he was the alpha dog”).
10
Matt Peterson, Ranked: Twitter Wars that Came a Little Too Close to Real Wars,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/twitter-warsranked/512330/.
11
Quite literally, as North Korea’s reaction showed. See Sterling et al., supra note 7.
7
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the United States’ power and influence behind them, not to
mention its nuclear payload. 12 Independent of the unsettling
reality that we live in an age where a stray tweet could start a
nuclear war, the fact that what was previously viewed as a casual
social media outlet is now center-stage in national and global
discussions raises crucial constitutional questions about how
First Amendment jurisprudence treats—or should treat—
executive speech in the modern day.
Since the advent of the television, U.S. presidents have
been able to broadcast messages that reach nearly every home in
America simultaneously,13 so, at first blush, social media simply
seems like an upgrade in communication technology. However,
with the increasingly ubiquitous role of the Internet and social
media in our lives,14 in politics,15 and in our overarching political
dialogue,16 it is clear that social media is more than just the latest
carrier wave. Our First Amendment standards may need to be
reassessed to account for the impact of modern technology,
which has reshaped how we conceive of speech—and may call
for readjusting how we regulate it. This consideration is
especially important in the context of executive power, where the
stakes are necessarily higher.
The crucial point is not that the judiciary may need to
react differently with Donald Trump in the office of the President
than someone else, but that his presidency has demonstrated that
executive speech’s greater power and therefore greater potential
for destructive consequences is on a far different scale than other
individuals: global and, without exaggeration, possibly worldending. Recent legal decisions make it clear that the more
entwined the Internet has become with our society, the more the

12

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States . . . .”).
13
Andrew Glass, First White House Speech Airs on TV, October 5, 1947, POLITICO (Oct.
5, 2010, 4:38 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/10/first-white-housespeech-airs-on-tv-october-5-1947-043100.
14
See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ (“The internet
represents a fundamental shift in how Americans connect with one another, gather
information and conduct their day-to-day lives.”); Andy Kinsey, The Impact of Social
Media on Our Daily Lives, ANDY KINSEY (Sept. 21, 2012),
https://andykinsey.co.uk/guest-articles/2012-09-21-daily-lives-social-mediaimpact/.
15
See Jeff Fromm, New Study Finds Social Media Shapes Millennial Political Involvement
and Engagement, FORBES (June 22, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jefffromm/2016/06/22/new-study-finds-socialmedia-shapes-millennial-political-involvement-and-engagement/#22c23f782618.
16
See Farad Manjoo, Social Media’s Globe-Shaking Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/technology/social-medias-globe-shakingpower.html?_r=0.
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insulation between online and real life has eroded.17 In a similar
way, when social media amplifies the President’s words, it
amplifies both the power and danger of presidential speech along
with it. The reality of their potentially dangerous consequences
should not be masked by a seemingly innocuous mode of
delivery.18 As we hear the alarms of nuclear war sounding louder
than they have in decades, a medium meant for short, pithy, offthe-cuff thoughts 19 is now the carrier of speech that could get
U.S. soldiers killed without further provocation.20 While Donald
Trump’s actions may be endemic to his presidency alone, they
highlight the risks attendant on presidential speech channeled
through social media and raise the question of whether and when
executive freedom of speech should be more carefully restricted.
This Note addresses the First Amendment dimensions of
executive speech and considers the possible necessity—and
ramifications—of developing a new standard for heightened
executive speech restrictions that would take into account both
the unique power of executive speech and the landscape of social
media communication.
The core question is whether executive speech should be
held to a higher First Amendment standard because of its greater
potential to influence its listeners, because of its increased reach
17

From the proliferation of statutes against cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and revenge
porn, see, e.g., Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief
Review of State Cyberbullying Laws and Policies, Cyberbullying Research Ctr.,
https://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf (last updated Jan.
2016); 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited May 5, 2018), to a
recent court case holding a teenage girl criminally responsible for the death of a
boyfriend whom she convinced to commit suicide over text, see, e.g., Kalhan
Rosenblatt, Michelle Carter, Convicted in Texting-Suicide Case, Sentenced to 15 Months in
Jail, NBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/michelle-carter-convicted-texting-suicide-case-sentenced-15-months-jailn789276, there is an increased willingness to treat actions taken through digital or
social media as seriously as their real-world counterparts, see, e.g., 15B AM. JUR. 2D
Computers & the Internet § 13 (2017) (relating to the interpretation of cyberstalking
statutes); Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 846
(2010) (overviewing attempts by policymakers to combat cyberbullying and to
account for how “[t]he Internet creates a virtual world that can result in very real
consequences”); Taryn Pahigian, Ending the Revenge Porn Epidemic: The Anti-Revenge
Porn Act, 30 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 105, 131–37 (2017).
18
See Nicol Turner-Lee, How the President’s Twitter Account Affects Civil Society,
BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/02/16/how-the-presidents-twitteraccount-affects-civil-society/.
19
Nick Bilton, All Is Fair In Love and Twitter, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/magazine/all-is-fair-in-love-andtwitter.html.
20
See Smith & Williams, supra note 4 (“Since the U.S. declared war on our country,
we will have every right to make countermeasures, including the right to shoot down
the U.S. bombers even when they are not yet inside the airspace border of our
country.” (quoting North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho)).
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through social media, or because of the confluence of the two.
Social media’s new place in politics and as part of presidential
communications puts stress on our constitutional foundations
along two crucial fault lines in First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, it evokes the question of whether the executive should be
held to a higher, more speech-restrictive standard under the First
Amendment because of his or her innately heightened power to
influence or incite while speaking in that role. Second, it presents
the question of whether that influence has a greater impact
through social media that could, in itself, change the equation of
whether presidential speech has crossed out of the borders of
First Amendment protection. Regardless of who is sitting in the
Oval Office, the President’s unique role, coupled with its unique
reach through social media, supports reevaluating executive
speech under the First Amendment and may justify
circumscribing it within stricter boundaries.
II. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Roots: Where We’ve Come From
At an elemental level, the First Amendment guarantee
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech” 21 affects the President the same way as any other
citizen22. The President can say whatever he or she wants, subject
only to the same embattled outer edges of First Amendment
protection that apply to the average person.
While a system that seems to value speech—all speech,
intrinsically—predominates now, the United States has gone
through epochs of far more speech-restrictive and governmentprotective jurisprudence. 23 Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous

21

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Robert Sharp, Does Freedom of Speech Apply to the President?, QUORA (Dec. 25,
2016), https://www.quora.com/Does-freedom-of-speech-apply-to-the-president
(“The free speech protections of the First Amendment and the subsequent Supreme
Court case law applies to all citizens, and the president is a citizen.”).
23
In the early 20th century, the Court upheld a series of convictions under the
Espionage and Sedition Acts, allowing suppression of speech that the government
believed would undermine the war effort or support ideologies deemed dangerous to
the government’s position. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49, 53 (1919)
(affirming convictions for “conspiracy to commit an offense against the United
States” by encouraging others to oppose the military draft); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 617, 624 (1919) (affirming convictions for conspiracy to distribute
printed materials containing “disloyal” language intended to engender contempt or
encourage resistance toward the United States government). The Court has indicated
these cases would not be decided the same way today. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“Although the Sedition Act [of 1798] was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of
history . . . [and t]he invalidity of the Act has also been assumed by Justices of this
Court.”).
22
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dissent in Abrams v. United States24 foreshadowed a very different
approach to the First Amendment. Although Holmes
d[id] not doubt for a moment that by the same
reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion
to murder, the United States constitutionally may
punish speech that produces or is intended to
produce a clear and imminent danger . . . [of]
substantive evils that the United States
constitutionally may seek to prevent[,] . . . only the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about . . . warrants Congress in setting a
limit to the expression of opinion . . . .25
While acknowledging that “war opens dangers that do not exist
at other times[,] . . . I had conceived[,]” Holmes reflected, “that
the United States through many years had shown its repentance
for the Sedition Act of 1798.” 26 With it, Holmes seemed to
suggest, the United States had also repented of its willingness to
stifle dissonant speech simply because it ran counter to the
government’s position. 27 The notion Holmes advocated has
since taken the field of First Amendment jurisprudence by storm:
rather than suppressing speech to stabilize democracy in times of
crisis, the “best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market[,]” and the best
test of our democracy is to weather those conflicting voices and
to grow based on the outcome of their debate.28 Modern First
Amendment decisions reflect a desire to put faith in the
democratic cacophony of free speech to resolve itself into clarity,
and place the burden on the government to allow criticism and
prove itself by withstanding dissent.
Law students and legal scholars of today may take the
concept of the marketplace for granted, along with its theoretical
underpinnings. However, the widespread acceptance of Holmes’
perspective involved a key philosophical shift: regarding free
speech as necessary—in fact, vital—for democracy. “The
freedom that the First Amendment protects is not . . . an absence
24

250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 627–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26
Id. at 628, 630. The Sedition Act to which Holmes refers, which restricted and
criminalized speech critical of the federal government, was part of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, antecedents to the laws at issue in Abrams. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
273 (“[T]he great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . first crystallized a
national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.”).
27
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (“Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the
mind of the country.”); see also id. at 630 (criticizing the government’s argument that
the common law of seditious libel is left intact under the First Amendment).
28
Id. at 630.
25
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of regulation. It is the presence of self-government.”29 On this
view, the First Amendment embodies the role of the people in a
representative democracy: the importance of protecting speech
is, in part, protecting the ability of the people to hold their leaders
accountable. 30 Free speech is also meant to press forward the
ideals of freedom, change, and progress. The reason that the
Constitution is not a strict enumeration of immutable rights and
responsibilities (apart from sheer impracticality) is because the
Founders understood that for the democratic experiment to
succeed, they needed to build into its system of government the
potential for change.31 The fora of free speech are, theoretically,
supposed to drive that change. 32 Ideas gather momentum and
support in the marketplace, and, forged by the fires of critical
debate, emerge to steer the country toward a different future—
on Holmes’ theory, 33 a better one. “[T]he principle of the
freedom of speech[,] as it stands in the Constitution . . . is an
expression of the basic American political agreement that, in the
last resort, the people of the United States shall govern
themselves.”34
The marketplace philosophy can feel like a devil’s
bargain. The host of ideas that march through the open doors of
our current First Amendment philosophy is a cavalcade ranging
over all imaginable forms of the grotesque, the appalling, the
29

Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
252.
30
In the pursuit of a strong, functional democracy,
[w]e, the people who govern, must try to understand the
issues which, incident by incident, face the nation. We
must pass judgment upon the decisions which our agents
make upon those issues. And, further, we must share in
devising methods by which those decisions can be made
wise and effective, or, if need be, supplanted by others
which promise greater wisdom and effectiveness. Now it
is these activities, in all their diversity, whose freedom fills
up the “scope of the First Amendment.”
Id. at 255.
31
See id. at 264 (“[T]he Framers could not foresee the specific issues which would
arise as their ‘novel idea’ exercised its domination over the governing activities of a
rapidly developing nation in a rapidly and fundamentally changing world . . . .
[B]oth they and we have been aware that the adoption of the principle of selfgovernment by ‘The People’ of this nation set loose upon us and upon the world at
large an idea which is still transforming men’s conceptions of what they are and how
they may best be governed.”).
32
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those
who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth . . . and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.”).
33
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”).
34
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 109 (1960).
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hateful, the cruel, and the repulsive. Examples of what must be
defended in the name of guarding the dedication to truth and
democracy may make one balk at enforcing Holmes’ ideology.
In that light, it is important to remember why we need speech.
When we question First Amendment standards, we are
questioning those rationales and the value of speech to
democracy.
B. Brandenburg: Where We Are
The current test for protected speech remains, as it has
been since the 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 35 a very
speech-protective one.36 Brandenburg was a member of the Ku
Klux Klan who invited a local reporter to film a rally taking place
in Hamilton County, Ohio.37 The film, subsequently broadcast
on several local and national networks, showed burning crosses,
members of the group carrying weapons, and a speech
containing derogatory statements about African-Americans and
other groups, advocating excising them from American society,
and calling for a march on Washington, D.C.38 Brandenburg’s
speech also threatened “revengeance” against the government if
it “continue[d] to suppress the white, Caucasian race.”39
Brandenburg was convicted under the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Act, which prohibited advocating the duty or
necessity of using violence, crime, and other unlawful means for
political reform, or assembling a group to teach or advocate that
doctrine.40 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held
the statute unconstitutional: in order to protect the right of free
speech, a state is forbidden from “proscrib[ing] advocacy of use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”41 This test reflects a key
First Amendment balancing act: finding the point at which

35

395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See, e.g., Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 147, 159 (2011) (describing Brandenburg as “a proud pillar of American First
Amendment jurisprudence precisely because it sets an extremely high bar to
imposing liability in incitement cases” despite the “completely despicable” content of
the speech at issue); Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 3 (2002)
(describing Brandenburg as “so extraordinarily speech-protective” that it raises the
question of whether it “really means as much as its literal wording seems to imply”
and whether courts are truly “prepared to make the commitment to freedom of
speech that the [Brandenburg] test appears to require”).
37
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
38
Id. at 445–46.
39
Id. at 446.
40
Id. at 444–45.
41
Id. at 447–48.
36
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advocacy of an ideology, so crucial to protest and to change,
becomes dangerous enough to justify restriction.42
The Brandenburg test still stands today.43 For speech to be
circumscribed under the First Amendment, it must be “directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and the
gravity of the harm feared must be balanced against the
likelihood of the speech actually causing that harm. 44 Courts
weigh the potential dangers that could arise from the speech at
issue against the likelihood and imminence of the possible
harm.45 The Brandenburg decision—and truly the track of First
Amendment jurisprudence at large—reflects the high priority
placed on the right to freedom of speech and its role in our
democracy.46 It embodies the view that the price of democracy,
the price of our constitutional principles, is that speech, whatever
its nature and content, will not be suppressed unless it reaches
the high threshold of being tied to a concrete and immediate
risk. 47 Unrestricted speech is supposed to feed the diverse
dialogue behind our representative democracy, and bring us
closer to truth and to a “more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity[,]” 48 but, even when the speech at issue is hateful,
destructive, and seems to contribute nothing positive, modern
First Amendment jurisprudence will not restrict it on that basis
alone.49 The reasoning is that if speech that is unpopular in one
moment in history is allowed to be suppressed simply because it

42

“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.” Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43
Chris Montgomery, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of
Terrorism: The Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141, 142
(2009).
44
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
45
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Brandenburg . . . makes it clear
that the First Amendment protects speech that advocates violence, so long as the
speech is not directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is not
likely to incite or produce such action.”); id. at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(“[U]nder Brandenburg, encouragement or even advocacy of violence is protected by
the First Amendment . . . .”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236
(2002) (“[T]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning it, absent some showing of a direct connection between the
speech and imminent illegal conduct.”) (internal citations omitted).
46
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(explaining that Justice Holmes’ foundational formulation of First Amendment
doctrine “served to indicate the importance of freedom of speech to a free society”);
Steven Pinker, Why Free Speech is Fundamental, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/26/why-free-speechfundamental/aaAWVYFscrhFCC4ye9FVjN/story.html.
47
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
48
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
49
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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is unpopular, it creates a precedent that may block the way of
crucial debate—often the road to crucial change—in the future.50
C. Speech in the Era of Social Media: Where We’re Going
With Brandenburg accompanying us into the modern day,
two key questions before the country may call for changing—or
adjusting our reading of—that long-standing test as applied to
executive speech. First is the question of whether executive
speech itself changes the Brandenburg equation because of the
President’s greater power to influence people and to incite
violence, harm, or “imminent lawless action.” 51 Second is
whether social media’s transformation of the country’s political
dialogue calls for a change in how “immediacy” is viewed, and
whether the use of social media—particularly by the executive,
whose inherent power may already heighten the risks endemic
to his or her speech—could justify heightened free speech
restrictions for the executive.
III.

EXECUTIVE SPEECH

Holding political office comes with both opportunities
and costs. On the one hand, what better way to be heard in a
representative democracy than to be a representative, and to
have the chance to speak for the ideals that you and, presumably,
your constituents share. On the other hand, from a First
Amendment perspective, being a political figure renders you less
protected from the speech of others.52

50

Take, for instance, the work of abolitionists and civil rights advocates early in the
nation’s history. They certainly represented a minority view, unpopular with many,
and had the government been allowed to repress their speech to alleviate the
discomfort of the majority at hearing their ideas, vital changes to society might never
have been made. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383 (referring to abolitionists
in the 1840s and civil rights protesters in the 1950s and 1960s as beneficiaries of the
fact that “for most of America’s history, protecting free speech has helped
marginalized or unpopular groups to gain political power and influence”);
MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY SPARKS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
MODERN AMERICA, 282, 416 (1992) (emphasizing the importance of protests and
boycotts, “a form of expression protected by the First Amendment,” in creating
momentum for the Civil Rights Movement, and noting that “[a]nother group of
protesters in the 1830s had launched the highly unpopular campaign to end
slavery”).
51
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
52
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1969) (holding that a published
advertisement expressing criticism of and grievances against an Alabama elected
official was protected by the First Amendment even though it contained erroneous
statements of fact because “[t]he interest of the public . . . outweighs the interest of [a
public official]” (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942))).
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A. Executive Immunity
Legally speaking, government actors are generally
afforded some special protections. They are insulated from
certain forms of liability: for instance, actions taken or decisions
made by government officials while acting in their official
capacity and within the scope of their duties typically cannot
subject them (or the government itself) to tort liability. 53 The
President in particular is insulated from suits based on actions
undertaken in his or her capacity as executive.54 The rationale for
these protections—that, to ensure smooth and effective
government, the law should prevent political actors from being
subjected to a battery of lawsuits for their decisions that could
potentially hobble the necessary functions of government55—is
especially significant with respect to the President. 56 The
intricacies of government involve balancing many high-stakes
interests and making choices that often involve sacrifice and
compromise. 57 The theory of democracy relies upon putting
someone in the position to make those choices unencumbered.58
With respect to the executive in particular, this reasoning
takes on special importance. At its core, Article II of the U.S.
Constitution empowers the President as a decision-maker, a
53

See, e.g., Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 446–48 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no liability in
a negligence action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
because the government, when exercising policy judgment in discretionary functions,
is shielded from liability).
54
See generally Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (“In view of the special
nature of the President’s constitutional offices and functions, we think it appropriate
to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within
the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.”).
55
“The reason for the official privilege is said to be that the threat of damage suits
would otherwise inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of
policies of government.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
56
See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 751 (“Because of the singular importance of the President’s
duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique
risks to the effective functioning of government.”).
57
The decisions and discretionary functions of government officials involve
balancing different, often-conflicting policy considerations, and weighing the risks
and advantages of any given course of action. This aspect of governmental decisionmaking is what gives rise to immunity for liability in the execution of discretionary
functions. The higher a government official is on the chain of decision-making
authority, the more heightened the considerations and consequences balanced in
their choices—particularly for military leaders, or for the Commander in Chief,
whose decisions directly involve risks to the lives of American soldiers. See 63 C.J.S.
Municipal Corporations § 886 (2018) (discussing the balancing in decision-making that
underlies discretionary immunity for a governmental body); 91 C.J.S. United States §
321 (2018) (providing an overview of the sovereign immunity usually provided to the
government and extended to its agents).
58
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (“There is nothing
novel about governmental confidentiality. The meetings of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete privacy . . . . Most of the Framers
acknowledge that without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed
could have been written.”) (internal citations omitted).
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position of trust in which the person in office is supposed to
reflect, by their actions and statements as an individual, the
interests and ideals of the people.59 The executive must examine
and synthesize all of the competing concerns and large-scale
decisions facing the country, and, in light of all those factors,
make the choice that most represents the will and ideals of the
people.60 It is for this reason that the law does not allow private
citizens, who may only be able to see a tiny fraction of the larger
backdrop against which the decision was made, to attack the
executive for those difficult choices.61
The Supreme Court has held that the President “is
entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated
on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally
mandated incident of the President’s unique office, rooted in the
constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and
supported by our history.”62 Because the President is “entrusted
with supervisory and policy responsibility of utmost discretion
and sensitivity[,] . . . diversion of his energies by concern with
private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective
functioning of government.”63 The President must be vested with
the power to carry out his Article II duties, and “[t]he [P]resident
cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment or detention[]
while he is in the discharge of his duties of office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to
possess an official inviolability.”64
“The President’s unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials.” 65 The legal
treatment of executive power recognizes two central
constitutional principles of separation of powers. First, that the
crux of executive power is based on the importance of vesting in
one individual the ability to make crucial, high-stakes decisions
59

Article II entrusts the president with receiving foreign ambassadors, and
appointing United States ambassadors, U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3, meaning that the
president and his or her appointees form the public, international face of the country.
The president is also required to deliver a report on the “State of the Union” to
Congress, conveying to lawmakers the status of the country at large—and,
presumably, communicating the interests and needs of the people at large. See id. § 3.
60
In a representative form of government, the leadership is meant to reflect the will
of the people, and is accountable to its constituents—thus the avenue of
impeachment, by which leaders and public officials can be removed if they are
believed to be unfit for their role, is left open. See U.S. CONST. art. II § 4. For a
discussion of the executive’s difficulties in balancing their own ideologies and their
responsibility to their constituents, see Kathy B. Smith, The Representative Role of the
President, 11 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 203 (1981).
61
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
62
Id. at 749.
63
Id. at 750–51.
64
Id. at 749 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1563, 418–19 (1st ed. 1833)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65
Id. at 750.
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on behalf of the nation that require a speed and decisiveness that
neither the legislature nor the judiciary can supply.66 As such, in
reviewing the actions of past presidents, the other branches have
been careful not to throw any administrative roadblocks in the
path of the executive that he or she could trip over in a crucial
moment. 67 Second, judicial decisions concerning executive
power highlight the Court’s unwillingness to be in the business
of policing and second-guessing every executive decision, and for
the same reason—separation of powers. The executive must be
able to execute its power, while the judiciary is there to define
the boundaries of the law when crossed.68 Preserving the ability
of the executive to act without constant judicial oversight and
without fear of reprisal for difficult choices forms the basis for
executive immunity.69 The judiciary operates on a presumption
of regularity70 and a presumption of good faith in assessing the
official acts of public officials.71 This trust in, and deference to,
the executive branch allows courts to smooth their own
processes, rather than busying themselves with overseeing the
minutia of executive activity, another nod to the all-important
balance of powers.72
Moving closer to the domain of speech, the President can
claim privilege in his or her confidential communications. 73
While the privilege is far from absolute, the courts balance the
66

See Martin Wald, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407,
1411 (1984) (“The President is capable of acting with more speed, decisiveness and
secrecy than any legislature . . . . There is a constant tension between the goals of
flexibility and efficiency, embodied in a head of state, and caution and consensus,
embodied in a legislature.”).
67
See id. (noting that the War Powers Resolution left intact the emergency exception,
allowing the president to respond to an attack without waiting for congressional
approval); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012).
68
“Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive
from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional
duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers;
the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar
constitutional underpinnings.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974).
69
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 at 752–53.
70
“It is a presumption of law, that all public officers, and especially such high
functionaries [as the President], perform their proper official duties until the contrary
is proved.” Phila. & Trenton R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. 448, 458 (1840); see also
United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (“[I]n the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officers] have properly
discharged their official duties.”).
71
See, e.g., Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[Government] agency
actions and affidavits are normally entitled to presumption of good faith.” (citing
U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991))).
72
“The Federal Supreme Court has recognized for a very long time that judicial
inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into
the workings of other branches of government.” 16A AM. JUR. 2D Legislative
Motivation § 187.
73
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 at 708.
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necessity of the information and the interest of justice against the
recognition that protecting the confidentiality of the President’s
words may be uniquely important. 74 Confidentiality of
presidential communications also implicates separation of
powers.75 “Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit
reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this
interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers,
it is constitutionally based.”76 Further, the privilege takes note of
the high stakes of the President’s role, particularly as
Commander-in-Chief: when “there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of [government documents as] evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged[,] . . . the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate and the court should not jeopardize the security
which the privilege is meant to protect.”77
B. Executive Vulnerability
In the context of free speech, by contrast, the First
Amendment traps public officials in the spotlight. Generally, the
speech of government actors, including the executive, is treated
no differently from that of other citizens—within the confines of
Brandenburg, they can say whatever they like.78 However, their
role renders them uniquely vulnerable to the speech of others.
Critical and even false speech against public officials is
protected.79 What would be defamation against a private citizen
is perfectly allowable against a public official or public

74

In explaining the heightened protection given to presidential communications, the
Supreme Court reasoned that
[t]he expectation of a President to the confidentiality of
his conversations and correspondence . . . has all the
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and
even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are
the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications.
Id.
75
See id. (“The privilege” protecting confidentiality of presidential communications is
“inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”).
76
Id. at 711.
77
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
78
See Sharp, supra, note 22.
79
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1969) (finding that an
elected commissioner could not succeed in a libel suit based on published criticisms
of his official conduct, even if they contained false statements of fact).

2018]

TAKING ORDERS FROM TWEETS

552

figure.80The rationale for disadvantaging political officials in this
way is much the same as the rationale for protecting them in
other contexts: their fundamental role in the democratic
process.81To preserve the integrity of a representative democracy,
citizens must be able to hold their leaders accountable. 82 The
importance of dissent and criticism—pushback on government
actions—is considered so central to democracy that First
Amendment jurisprudence allows for a wide margin of error and
even for intentional falsehood in order to keep a free flow of
speech that may call politicians to account for their actions.83
Allowing both the press and the citizens to act as a check on the
actions of political figures, the Court has said, entails allowing
robust criticism of officials both as to their policies and as
individuals.84 Politicians are seen as having essentially assumed
this risk by stepping into the political spotlight.85 As such, the
President’s legal standing with respect to the First Amendment
is already shaped by his or her role.
C. The Boundaries of Executive Speech
The already-differential treatment of the President under
the Constitution, in both positive and negative ways, lends
support to the argument that presidential speech might likewise
be justifiably restricted to a different degree than that of the
80

Compare Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“[W]e have
consistently ruled that a public figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to
reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement
was made ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.’” (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80)), with Gertz v. Robert Welch,
418 U.S. 323, (1974) (“Our accommodation of the competing values at stake in
defamation suits by private individuals allows the States to impose liability on the
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing that
that required by New York Times.”).
81
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282–83 (“It is as much [the citizen-critic’s] duty to criticize
as it is the official’s duty to administer . . . . It would give public servants an
unjustified preference over the public they serve [if immune from criticism.]”).
82
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he two greatest
securities [the people] can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power [are],
first, the restraints of public opinion . . . and, secondly, the opportunity of
discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in
order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which
admit of it.”).
83
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72.
84
Id.
85
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (“An individual who decides to seek governmental office
must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He
runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”); Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 275 (“‘[T]he press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and
measures of public men, of every description, which has not been confined to the
strict limits of the common law’ . . . . The right of free public discussion of the
stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle
of the American form of the government.” (quoting James Madison, Report of 1800
(Jan. 7, 1800), in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 570 (1836))).
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average citizen. First Amendment jurisprudence has promoted
(or at least tolerated) caution with respect to presidential speech,
allowing executives to keep their confidences when national
security or other critical interests are at stake, rather than being
forced to disclose the inner workings of their decisions as
President. 86 This approach contains a recognition of the
inherently higher risks involved with presidential actions and
communications. 87 By that same token, it hearkens to the
reality—as discussed above in the context of North Korea—that
presidential communications carry potential danger when
spoken that justifies their being kept confidential. As Justice
Stewart presciently noted, “the Executive is endowed with
enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and
international relations. This power, largely unchecked by the
Legislative and Judicial branches, has been pressed to the very
hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age.”88
The Court’s First Amendment decisions have been
colored by the understanding that the judiciary is not the first line
of defense; it is the people and the press.89 As much as executive
speech is privileged to protect its democratic purpose, analogous
considerations support the freedom of speech of the citizen-critic
of government:90
In the absence of governmental checks and
balances[,] . . . the only effective restraint upon
executive policy and power in the areas of national
defense and international affairs may lie in an
86

One ground supporting the argument for executive privilege is “the valid need for
protection of communications between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of
this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion.” United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
87
Even beyond the potentially dangerous ripple effect that presidential statements
can create in foreign affairs, and the high military stakes associated with the role of
Commander in Chief, see discussion supra Section I, the “sheer prominence” of the
President’s office and the fact that the President is entrusted with “the most sensitive
and far-reaching decisions . . . under our constitutional system” also heighten the
possible consequences of a President’s words and behavior, on both the domestic and
global stage, see Aviva A. Orenstein, Presidential Immunity from Civil Liability: Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 236, 245 (1983).
88
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
89
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269, 275 (“The constitutional safeguard [of the First
Amendment] ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” (quoting Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))); see also Owen M. Fiss, Building a Free
Press, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 187, 191 (1995) (“Democracy is a system of government
that ultimately allows the public to decide how it wishes to live; but democracy
presupposes that the public is fully informed . . . . A free press is meant to make this
supposition a reality.”).
90
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.
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enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical
public opinion which alone can here protect the
values of democratic government.91
In the end,
neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor
the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity . . . The impediment that [it] would
place in the way of the primary constitutional duty
of the Judicial Branch . . . would plainly conflict
with the function of the courts under Article III.92
There is a tacit presumption that the person in the office
of the President will modulate his or her speech in a way that
reflects his or her heightened capacity to influence and incite.
However, if the President is not effectively guarding against the
innate power (and corresponding danger) of speaking from that
office, the Court may be empowered to inscribe lines around the
executive sphere of freedom of speech, boundaries that would
recognize that a President’s capacity to incite is far above that of
the average citizen. The President’s words are like a match being
struck above a line of gasoline that laces its way across the globe,
not an unknown masked man trying to start a brushfire in rural
Ohio with a pair of sticks.
D. Danger & Likelihood: Responses to Executive Speech
The Brandenburg balance first takes into account the
potential dangers that can arise from the speech in question.
While no constitutional rule should be designed around the
behavior of a single individual or a single speaker, some of the
specters raised by the interpretations of President Trump’s
speech—and the ripple effect of those words—furnish examples
of how executive speech can more readily give rise to very
serious potential harms that, both in their scope and severity,
would not attach to the words of another speaker.
Several aspects of the President’s role contribute to the
greater potential of executive speech to incite action by others.
In a number of contexts, presidential speech can literally be
regarded as a call to action, possibly crossing the line into making
the speech dangerous enough to regulate. First and most
obviously, the President is the Commander in Chief of the
91
92

N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974).
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military. 93 What happens if a President tweets “Let’s bomb
North Korea!”? To be sure, Twitter is not the standard platform
for military orders, but technically speaking, that sentence is a
command from someone with the authority to issue it. Second,
if not an order, presidential permission could be a powerful
influence—and a possible defense—to one’s actions. When
President Trump referred to suspected Latino gang members as
“animals” and encouraged police officers to let them strike their
heads on the doors of squad cars,94 did he give permission to
engage in police brutality? Against the backdrop of Trump’s
continuing promises to “build a wall” to prevent Latino and
Latina people from entering the United States, those words
become racially charged, and could generate fear for people of
color in America, whether citizens or not.95 Another example of
a potentially coercive use of executive speech was Trump’s
Twitter attack on the NFL players who chose to kneel in protest
during the national anthem.96 While a private entity like the NFL
can exercise control over the speech of its employees without
violating the Constitution, it would be emphatically and
quintessentially unconstitutional for the government to stifle an
act of protest speech on that basis alone. 97 As such, Trump’s
tweet, suggesting that tax laws should be changed to penalize the
NFL for allowing the protest, 98 could be seen as an attempt to
leverage the threat of presidential power to compel certain
93

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States . . . .”).
94
Barbara Demick & Kurtis Lee, Trump Urges Officers and Immigration Officials to be
‘Rough’ on “Animals’ Terrorizing U.S. Neighborhoods, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2017, 4:20
PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-trump-ms13-story.html.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2017, 3:26
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/914255264282480640?lang=en
(“Very important that NFL players STAND tomorrow, and always, for the playing
of our National Anthem. Respect our Flag and our Country!”); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2017, 4:06 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/920606910109356032?lang=en (“The
NFL has decided that it will not force players to stand for the playing of our National
Anthem. Total disrespect for our great country!”). For a list of additional tweets, see
Sam Beldon, Trump Tweeted About the NFL and National Anthem 37 Times in a Month,
Bus. Insider (Oct. 23, 2017, 3:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/trumptwitter-campaign-against-anthem-protests-2017-10.
97
Like all provisions of the Constitution, the First Amendment protects the rights of
private citizens from infringement by the government, but does not protect against
invasions of those rights by corporate entities or other private citizens. See U.S.
CONST. amend I; see also, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 736 (1996) (“[T]he First Amendment, the terms of which apply to
governmental action, ordinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the
decisions of private citizens to permit, or to restrict, speech . . . .”).
98
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2017, 3:13 AM),
http://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/917694644481413129?lang=en (“Why
is the NFL getting massive tax breaks while at the same time disrespecting or
Anthem, Flag and Country? Change tax law!”).
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actions by government agencies, private organizations, and, by
extension, citizens.99
A more removed but perhaps more widespread ripple
effect: a President’s vindication or tacit acceptance of hate speech
or discriminatory attitudes carries a greater risk of leading to the
proliferation of hate crimes and violence, because people holding
those discriminatory views may believe that they have the
President’s stamp of approval to act on their beliefs. 100 Such
speech from the executive may also chill speech on the other side
of the line: people who are part of a racial or other minority
group might be deterred from speaking for fear of reprisal from
the President, or of the violence his or her words seem to be
inviting against them by others.101 In that light, would Trump’s
inflammatory rhetoric with regard to race relations, 102 LGBT
individuals, 103 or Muslims, 104 constitute incitement to violence
and hate crimes? Bias-motivated crimes are acknowledged to
entail different, broader risks than other crimes,105 so if certain
speech increases their likelihood, restricting it may be more
99

See Noah Feldman, The Guy in the Bully Pulpit Can’t be a Bully, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
11, 2017, 2:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-11/trumps-presidential-bullying-violates-the-first-amendment (arguing that because the IRS
answers to the president, this tweet can be seen as an “order [to] the IRS to
reconsider or alter the league’s tax status,” constituting a violation of the First
Amendment, which “bars presidential bullying that includes a concrete threat to take
government action against a private citizen or group in order to coerce speech”).
100
Julia Manchester, David Duke: Charlottesville Protests About ‘Fulfilling Promises of
Donald Trump, THE HILL (Aug. 12, 2017, 4:19 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blogbriefing-room/news/346326-david-duke-charlottesville-protests-about-fulfillingpromises.
101
“For marginalized communities, the power of expression is impoverished for
reasons that have little to do with the First Amendment. Numerous other factors in
the public sphere chill their voices but amplify others. . . . [S]ystematic harassment
and threats . . . stifle their ability to speak.” K-Sue Park, The A.C.L.U. Needs To
Rethink Free Speech: Commentary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/opinion/aclu-first-amendment-trumpcharlottesville.html.
102
See Marc Fisher, Trump and Race: Decades of Fueling Divisions, WASH. POST (Aug.
16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-and-race-decades-offueling-divisions/2017/08/16/5fb3cd7c-8296-11e7-b35915a3617c767b_story.html?utm_term=.53a0b9ef0f92.
103
See Trudy Ring, Trump’s 14 Most Egregiously Homophobic and Transphobic Moves,
ADVOCATE (Nov. 9, 2017, 6:28 AM),
https://www.advocate.com/politics/2017/11/09/trumps-14-most-egregiouslyhomophobic-and-transphobic-moves.
104
See Anthony Zurcher, What Trump Team Has Said About Islam, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38886496 (presenting a
measured analysis of statements by Trump and his advisors about Muslims, but
quoting Professor Khaled Baydoun as asserting that “[s]capegoating Islam and
vilifying Muslims was far more than merely campaign messaging; for Donald Trump
it was a winning strategy”).
105
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993) (upholding a statute singling
out bias-motivated crimes for greater penalties in part because such crimes are “more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims,
and incite community unrest”).
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readily justified. To be restricted, speech must be “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” 106 President
Trump’s statements may not have been infused with that intent,
but that did not prevent them from having an effect, 107 and
Brandenburg turns on effects.108
E. Immediacy: When the Harm Becomes Real
The Brandenburg metrics of immediacy and likelihood of
imminent lawless action 109 seem to indicate that the decision
leaned in part on the Court’s sense that the words of the speakers
in Brandenburg were unlikely to have an effect or reach a large
audience, or, at the very least, not imminently.110 The likelihood
of a harm occurring in response to someone’s speech is a
function of two things: how many people are listening and how
likely they are to act on the speaker’s words. The presidency
inherently increases the count on both of these variables. The
greater weight and influence of executive speech may, in itself,
tip the risk analysis of Brandenburg toward subjecting presidential
speech to heightened restrictions because the likelihood of
lawless action occurring as a direct result is higher. Unlike
Brandenburg, who had few listeners, and even fewer inclined to
give credence to his views, all eyes are on whoever holds the
office of President, so he or she has a much larger audience and
a much larger possible response. Before the Charlottesville
riot, 111 David Duke, former leader of the KKK, referred to
106

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasizing that speech should
not be restricted on the basis of ideas alone, even those promoting possible violence,
so long as they fall short of creating an imminent and likely risk of lawless action in
response to the speech). Indeed,
[T]he mere abstract teaching of . . . the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is
not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial
. . . evidence of a call to violence now or in the future
which is sufficiently strong . . . .
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961).
107
Clark Mindock, Number of Hate Crimes Surges in Year of Trump’s Election, INDEP.
(Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/hatecrimes-us-trump-election-surge-rise-latest-figures-police-a8055026.html; Alexis
Okeowo, Hate On The Rise After Trump’s Election, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:10
PM), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hate-on-the-rise-after-trumpselection.
108
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
109
Id.
110
See Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy On Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the
Internet Era, U. TOL. L. REV. 227, 233 (2000).
111
Originally called the “Unite the Right” rally by its organizers, white nationalists
from around the United States flooded the streets of Charlottesville, Virginia, on
August 11–12, 2017, protesting the removal of a statute of Robert E. Lee. The violent
demonstrations and clashes with counter-protesters led to the death of one left-wing
counter-protester and left more than twenty others injured when a member of one of
the white supremacist groups drove a speeding car through the crowd. See Richard
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Donald Trump directly when he said that he and the hundreds
of “alt-right”112 protesters with him had taken Trump at his word
that “he’s going to take our country back” and were there to
vindicate the promises made during Trump’s campaign. 113
Listeners may give more weight to a President’s words, so
whatever risk of harm those words create, the sheer number of
listeners provided by the vast reach of the Internet, increases the
likelihood of lawless action in response.114 These factors argue
for moving the line of what constitutes “immediacy” further back
from the cliff’s edge, rather than risking escalation when the
results may be on a much larger scale than with another speaker.
The best reason to hesitate in restricting the speech of the
President is that, at the heart of the executive’s role, he or she is
supposed to speak for the people. The United States is a
representative democracy,115 and electing a representative is the
democratic act of consolidating the voices of many into one
person, entrusted to represent our interests when, as individuals,
we would be too diffuse to speak for ourselves. The President is,
for four years, 116 the figurehead and spokesperson of the
people. 117 In that light, censoring the speech of the President
seems deeply antithetical to our democratic ideals. If we believe
in the democratic and electoral system, then our President is a
reflection of us, however imperfect, and we have empowered the

Fausset & Alan Feuer, Far-Right Groups Surge Into National View in Charlottesville,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www-nytimescom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/2017/08/13/us/far-right-groups-blaze-into-national-viewin-charlottesville.html?partner=bloomberg; Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate,
Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesvilletimeline/?utm_term=.167680d20015.
112
Originated by white supremacist Richard Spencer around 2010, “‘Alt Right’ is
short for ‘alternative right.’ This vague term actually encompasses a range of people
on the extreme right who reject mainstream conservatism in favor of forms of
conservatism that embrace implicit or explicit racism or white supremacy.” Alt Right:
A Primer About the New White Supremacy, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/alt-right-a-primer-aboutthe-new-white-supremacy; see also John Daniszewski, How to Describe Extremists Who
Rallied in Charlottesville, AP: THE DEFINITIVE SOURCE (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://blog.ap.org/behind-the-news/how-to-describe-extremists-who-rallied-incharlottesville.
113
Manchester, supra note 100.
114
The impact of the Internet and social media generally, as well as their role in the
precipitation and organization of the Charlottesville rally, is discussed more
extensively infra Section IV.
115
Your Government and You: Democracy in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/system/files_force/USCIS/files/Government_and_You_ha
ndouts.pdf.
116
U.S. CONST. art. II § 1.
117
“When a head of state arrives in a foreign country the red carpet is extended to the
individual who represents his state in his person.” Smith, supra note 60, at 206.
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person in that role to speak on our behalf.118 When presidential
speech creates the kind of dangers, at home or abroad, that
would be cause to restrict the speech of an ordinary citizen in
order to prevent harm, we are left with the strange conundrum
of needing to silence someone who is meant to be our voice.
If one should guard against the absolute corruption of
absolute power, what about democratic power? Democratically
elected officials are only entrusted with power because they are
meant to represent the citizens, not because the citizens abdicate
their own voice and give the officials unrestricted license to act
as they choose.119 “[I]n our system, while sovereign powers are
delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts.” 120 That perspective may empower the Court,
with an eye on the First Amendment goal of bettering our
democracy, to constrain executive speech when it is detrimental
to its own source.
IV.

SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

The advent of social media has transposed much of our
cultural and political dialogue into the form of online
commentary and discussion. 121 During his presidency, Trump
has stated that social media is his preferred mode of
communication with the American people, and that he is
speaking in his official capacity as President over Twitter. 122
Through the megaphone of social media, the risks and
ramifications of presidential speech are likewise magnified.123 In
that respect, First Amendment jurisprudence is met with a
118

See id. at 205 (“The standard by which a representative should be judged in a
democratic state . . . is ‘whether he has promoted the objective interests of those he
represents’ . . . . A good representative may not always follow the opinions of his
constituents. When he chooses to depart from [them] he has a burden to explain his
actions [to the people].”).
119
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (“It is a misfortune incident to
republican government . . . that those who administer it may forget their obligations
to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust.”).
120
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
121
See Hayley Eastman, Communication Changes with Technology, Social Media, DAILY
UNIVERSE (July 7, 2013), http://universe.byu.edu/2013/07/07/1communicationchanges-with-technology-social-media/.
122
See Tamara Keith, Commander-In-Tweet: Trump’s Social Media Use and Presidential
Media Avoidance, NPR (Nov. 18, 2016, 3:46 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/18/502306687/commander-in-tweet-trumps-socialmedia-use-and-presidential-media-avoidance.
123
The intersection of many attributes of social media creates this effect. Posts are
delivered instantaneously, and, depending on the number of followers, to a large
number of people. From there, they can proliferate equally quickly as they are shared
between users and across social media platforms, fanning out across the world to a
huge number of people in a matter of hours or days, with little to no filtering or
editing.
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question it has not confronted before: whether executive speech
over social media should be held to the same standards as that of
other users, or whether, in combination with the power and
influence of the speaker, it requires a higher standard.
A. Fitting Social Media Into the First Amendment
Speech on social media is by and large treated the same
way as other speech.124 Legally speaking, it has been brought into
the fold of the First Amendment relatively quickly: digital speech
is speech, protected in the same way and to the same extent as
spoken or printed words.125 “While in the past there may have
been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a
spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is
clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the
Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.” 126 The
courts have already begun to address the increasing role of social
media in politics127 and are taking steps to ensure that political
speech cannot be stifled by politicians simply because it is easier
to block someone on Facebook than silence them in a town
meeting. 128 Indeed, far from insulating politicians’ conduct, a
public official who, in her official capacity, blocked a constituent
from an online forum because she took offense at his claim of
unethical government conduct was held to have “committed a
cardinal sin under the First Amendment.” 129 As a young
physician currently suing130 Donald Trump for blocking him on
Twitter insightfully warns:

124

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
Internet].”).
125
Id.
126
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct 1730, 1735 (2017) (holding that a statute
restricting registered sex offenders’ access to certain social media websites was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and noting that it was one of the first
cases that the Court had taken to “address the relationship between the First
Amendment and the modern Internet”).
127
Id. at 1735 (noting that governors in all fifty states and almost every member of
Congress have set up Twitter accounts for the purpose of engaging with their
constituencies); see also David Kravets, Politicians’ Social Media Pages Can Be 1st
Amendment Forums, Judge Says, ARSTECHNICA (July 28, 2017, 1:18 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/07/politician-dinged-for-blockingcritical-constituent-from-facebook-page/.
128
See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Va.
2017).
129
Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va.
2017).
130
See Complaint, Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-05205
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 11, 2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3892179/2017-07-11-KnightInstitute-Trump-Twitter.pdf.
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While America’s founding fathers may not have
envisioned something like Twitter, they certainly
knew the importance of free speech to a
democracy. They would have been outraged if the
president could ban an American citizen from
reading his announcements in a newspaper or
book. We have now extended [free speech] rights
to both television and radio. If Twitter is somehow
exempt, so too will be many new and emerging
technologies. Blocking private citizens from
reading a president’s communications threatens
our democracy, our freedoms, and our future.131
Thus far, the law has not considered whether the
boundaries of free speech should be redrawn to account for how
the advent of social media has altered our speech, in everything
from day-to-day relationships to our national political dialogue.
Instead, it is trying to fit social media within the metric of our
existing First Amendment jurisprudence, where, in reality, it
may no longer fit. While “the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do
not vary when a new and different medium for communication
appears[,]” 132 in “considering the application of unchanging
constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology,
. . . [we] should not jump to the conclusion that new technology
is fundamentally the same as some older thing with which we are
familiar.”133 “Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each
may present its own problems.”134 The question is whether social
media like Twitter are different enough—and have changed
speech enough—to change where we draw the lines of the First
Amendment.
B. Executive Speech Amplified: Presidential Voices in New Media
Trump’s use of social media to “circumvent traditional
media and talk directly to the people” 135 may seem like an
enticing notion and, in fact, it is not unprecedented. During the
Great Depression, for instance, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fireside
chats were an important step taken by a President to
131

Eugene Gu, Why I’m Suing President Trump for Blocking Me on Twitter, FORTUNE
(July 12, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/12/donald-trump-twitter-lawsuit-suedblock-unconstitutional/.
132
Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
133
Id. at 806 (Alito, J., concurring).
134
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
135
Gu, supra note 131.
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communicate directly and personally with the public 136 —and,
carried over radio, they were a “revolutionary experiment with a
nascent media platform[,]” 137 as Twitter is today. There is a
“long tradition of presidents going around the so-called filter of
the press . . . and get[ing] directly to the American people . . .
Presidents want to get their message out, unfiltered by the
press.”138 Traced from the fireside chats to Reagan’s primetime
news conferences to Obama’s highly produced videos released
on social media,139 Trump’s use of Twitter can be seen “as an
extension of what other presidents have done,” 140 a natural
development for the presidency in the social media age.
President Obama’s use of Twitter during his presidency
exemplified the niche one might have expected social media to
fill in the Oval Office.141 The first President to take office with
social media truly on the rise, Obama adopted it as a notable part
of his online presence, and “his tech savvy was heralded as a
bright light for democracy.”142Using it to make announcements
or to express sentiments of sympathy or solidarity, “[t]he tweets
he post[ed] to @POTUS never seem[ed] impulsive; they
seem[ed] made for posterity.”143 Obama did not use social media
to cast aspersions on dissenters or political opponents, let alone
address world leaders in ways that could be read as goading them
toward nuclear war. “Even his jokes [were] calculated to be
minimally offensive and maximally educational.”144
However, with many of Trump’s tweets a far cry from the
carefully composed presidential addresses of Roosevelt and
other successive presidents,145 the question is whether and how
136

Diana Mankowski & Raissa Jose, The 70th Anniversary of FDR’s Fireside Chats,
MUSEUM OF BROAD. COMMC’NS,
https://web.archive.org/web/20120517183213/http://www.museum.tv/exhibition
ssection.php?page=79 (last visited May 5, 2018).
137
Adrienne LaFrance, Donald Trump is Testing Twitter’s Harassment Policy, ATLANTIC
(July 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/thepresident-of-the-united-states-is-testing-twitters-harassment-policy/532497/
(suggesting that perhaps the Twitter platform itself should take steps to police
Donald Trump’s invectives on Twitter).
138
Keith, supra note 122.
139
See id. (noting that one example of President Obama’s forays into the social media
world was a video on a popular comedian’s show that was meant to “sell the
Affordable Care Act to young people”).
140
Id.
141
See Amanda Hess, Trump, Twitter and the Art of His Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/arts/trump-twitter-and-the-art-ofhis-deal.html?nytmobile=0&_r=1.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
See Bridie Pearson-Jones, Donald Trump Has Been on a Very Long, Very Incoherent
Twitter Rant, INDEP.: INDY 100, https://www.indy100.com/article/donald-trumpcrashed-twitter-loving-viral-potus-fake-news-theresa-may-angela-merkel-7760336; see
also Matt Flegenheimer, What’s a ‘Covfefe’? Trump Tweet Unites a Bewildered Nation,
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to regulate the presidential use of new media.146 Roosevelt “used
his fireside chats to explain policy without having reporters
condense and interpret his message . . . [and to] reassure the
public, directly.” 147 Trump’s communication over Twitter has
the opposite effect: rather than using a platform to communicate
more expansively with the American people, Twitter, with its
miniscule character limit, 148 invites oversimplification if not
distortion.149 People want to hear from their President, to “[t]ake
his measure and that’s not something that’s suitable for Twitter.
Announcements are, but explaining the guts of policy isn’t.”150
Although many presidents had friction with the media, 151 it
should raise eyebrows for a president to revel in circumventing
the media,152 given their important historical role in acting as a
check on politicians,153 both by keeping the citizenry informed so
that representative reinforcement can act as a pressure on sitting
government officials, and by being the source of information if
the government commits a wrong.154 “[T]he principle of elected
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/politics/covfefe-trumptwitter.html?mtrref=www.google.com.
146
Under Trump, “[w]hat was once a hopeful place for global connection and
resistance has become a site for coordinating harassment campaigns, connecting with
white supremacists and accelerating unverified and sometimes dangerous rumors.”
See Hess, supra note 141.
147
Keith, supra note 122.
148
See Brett Molina, So Long, 140. Hello, 280: Twitter Doubles Character Count on Tweets,
USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017, 5:41 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/11/07/so-long-140-hello-280twitter-doubles-character-count-tweets/839604001/.
149
Peter Suber, Not On Twitter Please, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y
(last revised Oct. 25, 2017, 9:59 AM),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/~psuber/wiki/?title=Not_on_Twitter_please&oldid=104
3 (“I like dialogue . . . . But I don’t like oversimplification. In fact, I like dialogue in
part because it helps us overcome oversimplification. Hence, I don’t like dialogue on
Twitter.”).
150
Keith, supra note 122 (quoting Martha Joynt Kumar, Professor of Political
Science, Towson University).
151
Jason Daley, The Complicated History Between the Press and the Presidency,
SMITHSONIAN: SMARTNEWS (June 14, 2016),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/complicated-history-between-pressand-presidency-180959406/.
152
Matt Kwong, Trump’s Strategy of Bypassing the Media Raises ‘Danger Signs,’ CBC
NEWS (Nov. 23, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-mediastrategy-1.3863148.
153
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“Suppression of the right of the press
to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against
change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution
thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.”).
154
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“The press was protected [by the First Amendment] so that it could bare
the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press
can effectively expose deception in government.”); see generally Clay Calvert &
Mirelis Torres, Putting the Shock Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence: When Freedom
for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of Informational Privacy on the
Internet, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323 (2011) (discussing the “watchdog” role of
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officials being accountable to the public through the press is one
that’s fundamental to our democracy.” 155 “The social media
platforms that were once heralded as democratic tools could also
be used to undermine democratic norms[,]” 156 compromising
citizens’ ability to effectively question the government, and
distorting the representative relationship between the President
and the people.
C. Reach & Risks: Presidential Social Media Presence
“An unprecedented feature of Donald Trump’s successful
campaign for president was his personal use of Twitter.”157 As
President, his tweets seem to have been making front-page news
since day one,158 and the stakes have been rising as he discusses
increasingly serious matters via tweet. 159 The Department of
Justice addressed some of the uncertainty around Trump’s
modus operandi with a perhaps more unsettling conclusion:
Trump’s tweets are “official statements of the President of the
United States.” 160 The D.O.J. treating the tweets as official
statements indicates that, in a legal context, they could be relied
on, and sharply underlines what is at stake when the executive
speaks over social media.161

journalism and its First Amendment “checking value . . . against government
malfeasance”); see also Martha Joynt Kumar, Presidential Press Conferences: Windows on
the Presidency and Its Occupants, THE WHITE HOUSE HISTORICAL ASS’N,
https://www.whitehousehistory.org/presidential-press-conferences (last visited May
5, 2018) (“In a representative government, . . . [r]eporters act as surrogates for the
public.”).
155
Keith, supra note 122 (quoting Brendan Nyhan, Professor of Gov’t, Dartmouth
College); see also Fiss, supra note 89.
156
Hess, supra note 141.
157
Keith, supra note 122.
158
See id.; see also Jessica Estepa, Trump Has Tweeted 2,461 Times Since the Election.
Here’s A Breakdown of His Twitter Use, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017, 3:13 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/11/07/trumphas-tweeted-2-461-times-since-election-heres-breakdown-his-twitter-use/822312001/.
159
For a discussion of President Trump’s interchanges with North Korea, see
discussion supra section I.
160
Lorelai Laird, DOJ Says Trump’s Tweets are Official Presidential Statements, ABA J.
(Nov. 14, 2017, 2:49 PM)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/government_says_trumps_tweets_are_off
icial_presidential_statements/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_ca
mpaign=weekly_email. In the pending case of James Madison Project v. Department of
Justice, seeking the release of documents related to Trump’s alleged ties to Russia, the
Department of Justice attorneys filed a response to the judge in which they stated
that “the government is treating the statements upon which the Plaintiffs rely as
official statements of the President of the United States.” Id.
161
Among the starkest examples to date are those that border on threats that could
precipitate nuclear war with North Korea. See note 3 and accompanying text; see also
Donald J. Trump (@realDonald Trump), TWITTER, (Sept. 3, 2017, 4:46 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/904309527381716992 (implying that
violence is the “one thing” North Korea understands and would be the only
recourse).
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A prominent example is the series of tweets in which
Trump said that transgender individuals would no longer be
allowed to serve in the U.S. military. 162 Did those statements
constitute an Executive Order? A directive from the Commander
in Chief? The response from the rest of the government was
telling: the Pentagon would not change its policies for
transgender troops until given more details from the White
House, and military officials would not take any steps with
respect to transgender people in the military until the tweets were
clarified or codified 163 —they expressly refused to take orders
from a tweet.164
Notwithstanding its now-formalized status, 165 the fact
that the initial revelation of this “policy” took place over Twitter
with little advance warning to or consultation with military
officials166 shows what a fine—and potentially dangerous—line
a president walks when communicating through Twitter. As
with the possibility of declaring war, the stakes are high when
major policy decisions are fired off without warning on social
media, and certain declarations, taken at face value, could have
immediate and chaotic effects. The intuition that the
consequences of statements made over social media are not as
serious167 does not align with the gravity of presidential speech,
nor with its heightened ability to impact American lives—now
with 140 characters and the press of a button.168
The question of how social media speech by an executive
will be handled by the courts has already seen the light of day
162

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890193981585444864; Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472; Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890197095151546369.
163
Bryan Bender & Jacqueline Klimas, Pentagon Takes No Steps to Enforce Trump’s
Transgender Ban, POLITICO (July 27, 2017, 11:28 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/trump-transgender-military-ban-nomodification-241029 (pointing to a statement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there
would be “‘no modification’ to the military’s transgender policy, until the White
House drafts a formal request for a policy change”).
164
Id.
165
After a more official directive from President Trump, the “transgender military
ban” began working its way through federal courts and has currently been blocked by
preliminary injunction in a D.C. Circuit district court. See Doe v. Trump, 275 F.
Supp. 3d 167, 207 (D.D.C. 2017).
166
Travis J. Tritten, Top Army General Says He Learned of Trump Transgender Ban
Through News Reports, WASH. EXAMINER (July 27, 2017, 2:30 PM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/top-army-general-says-he-learned-of-trumptransgender-ban-through-news-reports/article/2629893.
167
See John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV.,
321, 322 (2004) (noting that the anonymity and invisibility of online interactions
contributes to the belief that online actions are disconnected real life ramifications).
168
Twitter’s original 140-character limit was doubled to 280 on—perhaps
pointedly—Election Day, 2017. See Molina, supra note 148.
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during Trump’s presidency. 169 The so-called “travel bans” or
“Muslim bans” were a series of executive orders that halted
citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering
the United States.170 The various incarnations of the “travel ban”
met with protests across the country, and took a fast track to the
courtroom in the form of injunctions on behalf of U.S. citizens
with relatives trapped, as it were, on the other side of the
barricade. 171 The circuit courts demonstrated a willingness to
acknowledge social media in their legal evaluations of
presidential speech and actions.172 En banc arguments before the
Fourth Circuit focused on whether or not extrinsic statements by
the President during both his campaign and his presidency—
including those made over Twitter—could be considered in
analyzing the motivations behind the Executive Orders.173 “In
context[,]” the Fourth Circuit decision declared, the Executive
Order “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and
discrimination.” 174 The context to which the court referred
included negative statements about Muslims that Trump made
during his campaign, on his campaign website, in news
interviews—and over Twitter.175 Trump also explained that if he
could not point overtly to Muslims, he would refer to the targets
of his revised Executive Order as “territories” instead.176
During oral arguments, members of the court seemed
affronted by the idea that they were judicially obligated to turn a
blind eye to Trump’s tweets because the Executive Order was
arguably neutral on its face—especially since Trump had
169

See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (2017), vacated,
138 S.Ct.353 (2017). Because the provisions of the Executive Order had expired by
their own terms, the Supreme Court gave instructions to dismiss the challenge as
moot, but “express[ed] no view on the merits.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (Mem.) (2017); Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.
2017); 772, Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 772 n.14 (2017) (citing to Trump’s tweets
and discussing whether they are “official statements”), vacated, Hawaii v. Trump, 874
F.3d 1112 (mem.) (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissing the case as moot following a Supreme
Court order and opinion).
170
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13780,
82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161
(Sept. 27, 2017) (extending the effect of the original two Executive Orders after the
expiration date of the second ban).
171
Michael D. Shear, New Order Indefinitely Bars Almost All Travel from Seven Countries,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www-nytimescom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/2017/09/24/us/politics/new-order-bars-almost-all-travelfrom-seven-countries.html?partner=bloomberg.
172
Id.
173
Oral Argument, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (2017)
(No. 17–2231(L)), http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/17-135120170508.mp3 (centering on a discussion of whether statements by President Trump
that allegedly evinced anti-Muslim animus could justify striking down an Executive
Order despite its facial neutrality with respect to religion).
174
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 572.
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Id. at 575–76.
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Id. at 576.
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essentially confessed on Twitter that it was fueled by identical
anti-Muslim sentiments. 177 The court found the Order
unconstitutional, a violation of the Establishments Clause of the
First Amendment.178 Although there is a high bar for challenging
“the political branches’ power over immigration . . . [it] is not
tantamount to a constitutional blank check”: the challenged
government action must be “facially legitimate and bona fide”—
that is, it must have a valid reason on its face, and be issued “in
good faith.” 179 In finding that President Trump’s Executive
Order was unconstitutionally discriminatory,180 the court needed
to look no further than—and did not hesitate to look at—
Trump’s Twitter feed.181
D. Imminence & Immediacy: The Impact of Social Media under
Brandenburg
These constitutional clashes have brought executive
speech over social media to the center of our national stage. The
key First Amendment question invoked is whether the ubiquity
of social media coupled with the innate power of executive
speech changes how executive speech should be viewed under
Brandenburg. The Brandenburg test tries to balance the variable of
whether the harm feared is really imminent against whether there
is a concrete likelihood that it will occur, rather than restricting
speech based on speculation as to what may or may not happen
in the future as a result of the speech.182 On both the metrics of
immediacy and likelihood of harm, executive speech, with social
media as its carrier, may well cross the threshold into being
dangerous enough to regulate.
Because Twitter is a private entity, and because of its
origins as a platform for unencumbered, pithy expressions of
personal opinion, it lacks some of the filters through which
177

See Oral Argument, supra note 173, at 23:18–24:13, 24:32–25:04, 26:18–28:11,
33;25–35:02, 41:20–43:15, 49:30–50:17, 1:17:25–1:18:31; see also Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 633 (Keenan, J., concurring) (describing the second
Executive Order as the “proverbial wolf in sheep’s clothing” because it “simply
attempted to effectuate the same discrimination through a slightly different vehicle”).
178
Because the issue before the court was whether to grant a preliminary injunction,
it framed its argument in terms of the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ success on the
merits and dubbed the Executive Order “likely unconstitutional” in violation of the
Establishment Clause, stating strongly that “EO-2 cannot be divorced from the
cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it.” Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project, 857 F.3d at 601, 603.
179
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590.
180
See id. at 601, 612 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“Invidious discrimination that is
shrouded in layers of legality is no less an insult to our Constitution than naked
invidious discrimination . . . . [W]e again encounter the affront of invidious
discrimination—this time layered under the guise of a President’s claim of unfettered
. . . authority to control immigration . . . .”).
181
See id. at 575–76, 594.
182
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
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information has travelled in the past—media such as
newspapers, television, or radio, where there is an opportunity
for at least a screening of the views to be aired, and for a reflective
choice to be made in giving something airtime.183 On top of the
innate immediacy of instant access to a speaker’s words, social
media reaches citizens wherever they are, whatever they are
doing,184 giving speech greater potential to incite.185 On one level,
this observation is simply a numbers game: if the speech can
reach everyone and there is anyone who needs no more than the
words to be incited to action, the harm will occur. This reality
conflicts with the intuitive concept of imminence as a present
tense, interpersonal dynamic. A barrage of messages from the
President to the people, if not checked or carefully thought
through,186 creates a unique danger: if there is no opportunity to
temper or clarify those words, or to stem their almostinstantaneous spread, that speech, imbued with the weight of
executive authority, could lead to action far more quickly and
easily than the words of another speaker, or of a President of the
past. With any inflammatory remarks 187 poised to light a fire
because of the presidential role,188 the reach of media platforms
like Twitter—and the Internet generally—make any potential
harm a more immediate concern. If, anywhere in the darkest
corners of the internet, people need only to be galvanized by a
destructive call to action, then words that seem to carry the
endorsement of a person in authority may create the sense that
183

See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (“[A]
responsible press may choose never to publish the more sensitive materials.”); see also
Jennifer Grygiel, Twitter Needs to Monitor Trump’s Tweets: A Modest Proposal to Prevent
an Accidental Nuclear War, SLATE (Aug. 1, 2017, 7:15 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/08/a_modest_propo
sal_to_moderate_trump_s_tweets.html (suggesting that Twitter could monitor and
police tweets released by the President to prevent potentially dangerous
consequences of statements made in error or without due consideration for their
effects).
184
See Yoram Ebrahimi, The Effects of Social Media on Thinking and Behavior, THE
ODYSSEY (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.theodysseyonline.com/the-effects-socialmedia-thinking-and-behavior.
185
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see also Liam Stack, Brooklyn Man Arrested,
Accused of Supporting Islamic State, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/nyregion/brooklyn-man-arrested-isis.html
(describing how a Brooklyn man, charged with trying to provide material support to
terrorists, worked to engage with ISIS and ISIL over social media and hoped “to
stage an attack in Times Square similar to the one that killed 86 people in Nice,
France”).
186
“Trump overwhelms the [news] media with boatloads of what was once a rare
commodity: access. He creates impressions faster than journalists can check them.
By the time they turn up the facts, the news cycle has moved on to his next missive.”
Hess, supra note 141.
187
Tina Nguyen, Trump’s Violent Campaign Rallies Come Back To Haunt Him, VANITY
FAIR (May 2, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/donaldtrump-campaign-rally-lawsuits-incitement.
188
See discussion supra Sections III.D–E.
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their views have momentum—and their actions have
permission.189 Even if the innate incendiary power of executive
speech itself does not cross the line into being dangerous enough
to regulate more stringently under the First Amendment, the
addition of social media may push it over the edge—the
equivalent of giving a powerful speaker a sound truck that
broadcasts worldwide, at all hours, and reaches everyone.190
“[The] Court’s First Amendment cases draw vital
distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and
conduct[, and] the government may not prohibit speech because
it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed at some
indefinite future time . . . Without a significantly stronger, more
direct connection, the Government may not prohibit speech . . .
.” 191 The necessity of this link poses problems for analyzing
online speech under the First Amendment. Over the Internet,
there may be a time lag or a huge leap of distance between the
inciter and the person they incite, making the required
connection seem weaker or harder to prove. However, given the
realities of digital communication, perhaps temporal and
physical proximity should no longer be regarded as the only
ways that a cause can be connected to its effect with sufficient
“imminence.” 192 The argument that speech diffused over the
Internet, its potential impact is unknown, cannot have a clear
enough causal link to hold the speaker accountable for the
actions of the listener does not hold water as well for the
executive, who has more influence than an ordinary, unknown
user.
That said, it is important not to conflate the question of
immediacy of harm193 with the fact that social media has simply
made the risk of harm more uncertain. Because social media
communications ostensibly reach anyone with an Internet
connection, it makes the ability to predict potential harm perhaps
millions of times more difficult. Instead of a speaker standing on

189

See, e.g., Manchester, supra note 100 (discussing David Duke’s comments
surrounding the Charlottesville rally, in which he stated that Donald Trump’s
election “represents a turning point” and that the KKK “are determined to take our
country back, we’re going to fulfill the promises of Donald Trump.”).
190
The medium through which speech is delivered—not just the speech itself—can be
the basis for the restriction of First Amendment rights. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (holding that otherwise permissible speech was not protected by the
First Amendment when it was broadcast from a sound truck using sound amplifying
devices that created a loud and disruptive noise as it travelled down city streets).
191
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (holding that, under
the First Amendment, virtual child pornography could not be restricted solely on the
ground that it would encourage illegal conduct on the part of those who consume it
because the connection between the two is too remote).
192
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
193
Id.
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a street corner,194 or circulating leaflets to passersby,195 where the
imminence of lawless action can be felt in the air or read in the
faces of the crowd, the immediacy of harm may not be so easy
to see coming in the age of social media. For any one of the
people listening, the speech could be the catalyst to action. The
Internet audience is a darkened theatre house, where the size and
location of the crowd is unknown, and it is harder to know
whether they will react, or how violently, until they do.
It would be a drastic step to redefine imminence to
include not only what is actually and obviously impending, but
to encompass anything that is feared because its likelihood is an
unknown variable. However, social media may push society
toward this more cautious model over time out of necessity,
precisely because of the risks attached to that uncertainty, which
become more obscure as the Internet becomes more expansive.
As more of our lives are conducted in the digital world,196 the law
will have to stretch its definition of culpability into that arena
rather than letting actions that take place online be insulated
because they seem, arguably, abstracted from their results in the
physical world.
E. Power & the Potential for Violence: Reassessing the Likelihood of
Harm
This crucial question of where to draw the lines of free
speech online may need to come to the forefront more quickly
with respect to the President. When it comes to executive speech,
the argument for preemptive restriction and greater caution is
more compelling. The President’s ability to influence or incite is
more apparent, and, consequently, the potential harm more
likely if he or she invites violence.197 The presidency is a position
of trust—on the premise that we the people bestow on one
individual the ability to make choices for us and speak for us as
a country.198 We are more likely to follow people we trust, more
194

See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
196
As the use of Internet technology has become more accessible, more portable,
and more pervasive, it has become a bigger part of how Americans conduct their
daily lives; it is being used for a fast-increasing and diverse range of tasks—from
sending work emails and depositing checks to hailing cabs and seeking romantic
partners. See Lee Rainie & John B. Horrigan, Getting Serious Online: As Americans Gain
Experience, They Pursue More Serious Activities, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 3, 2002),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2002/03/03/getting-serious-online-as-americans-gainexperience-they-pursue-more-serious-activities/; Lee Rainie & Andrew Perrin, 10
Fact About Smartphones as the iPhone Turns 10, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 28, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/28/10-facts-about-smartphones/.
197
See, e.g., discussion supra Section III.D.
198
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he sense of the people
should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust [i]s to be
confided.”).
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likely to listen to them, and more likely to act based on their
example. 199 The extent to which social media is woven into
society compounds executive speech’s greater potential to incite
imminent lawless action. Unlike the defendants in Brandenburg,
whose views were broadcast on a limited network of Ohio news
platforms, 200 speakers on social media today can have an
audience of millions in a matter of minutes, and their words stay
plastered on the wall of a Twitter message board, giving readers
plenty of time to join the mob of supporters. The Brandenburg
decision may have been partly rooted in the Court’s sensibility
that a dozen men in a field in rural Ohio had little potential to
impel others to action 201 —not forgetting that the speech in
Brandenburg included a direct invitation to a KKK march on
Washington, D.C., “four hundred thousand strong.” 202
However, social media places us in a different age. Social media
entails an intrinsically greater reach—if Brandenburg had been
speaking today on Twitter, that march 203 might have actually
occurred. While a chorus of Twitter likes, even thousands of
them, seems harmless in the digital world, it would be a mistake
to think that those expressions are far away from the edge where
they spill over into real-world actions—especially since they
already have.
On August 12, 2017, every First Amendment professor’s
most sobering hypothetical went marching through the streets of
Charlottesville, Virginia.204 The heavily armed white nationalist,
KKK, neo-Nazi protest that cost the life of a counter-protester205
would not have happened without the organizational forces of
the Internet and social media to actualize a call for action that
summoned people from all corners of the Internet, from all parts

199

Jojanneke van der Toorn et al., More Than Fair: Outcome Dependence, System
Justification, and the Perceived Legitimacy of Authority Figures, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 127, 137 (2011) (demonstrating how perceived legitimacy of an authority
figure—defined as trust and confidence in authority—can not only be a product of
dependence on that authority, but can also lead to a stronger feeling of obligation to
defer to that person and their requests).
200
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969).
201
See discussion supra Section III.E; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.
202
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
203
See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text; infra note 206 and accompanying
text.
204
See supra note 111 and accompanying text; infra note 206 and accompanying text.
205
See supra note 111 and accompanying text; infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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of the country.206 Today, a small, isolated group of speakers207
can reach and organize a vast number of people with ease, and
far more readily prompt them to engage in far more lawless
actions than gathering in protest.208 Giving that same reach to
someone with the arsenal of the presidency behind their words
tips the scales precipitously if they were to espouse the same kind
of ideas. Coupling the reality of social media communication
with the credence often given to presidential speech, there is a
greater risk that a President’s comments reviling certain racial or
ethnic groups,209 certain sexual orientations,210 or simply political
opponents211 could incite, or even be seen to compel, violent or
lawless action by his listeners. Or, to use the unintentionally
ominous Twitter terminology, his “followers.”212
The conversation between the President and the country
is a unique dynamic. Since the advent of the Internet, the law has
mostly confronted a small smattering of frightening stories,
where lone individuals inspired or instructed by what they saw
206

The “Unite The Right” rally that became the Charlottesville riot was orchestrated
by various “alt-right” websites and their affiliated clubs, with some attendees having
traveled hundreds, and even thousands, of miles to Charlottesville, Virginia. See
Maura Judkis, Charlottesville White Nationalist Demonstrator Loses Job at Libertarian Hot
Dog Shop, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/food/wp/2017/08/14/charlottesvillewhite-nationalist-demonstrator-fired-from-libertarian-hot-dogshop/?utm_term=.35976a54f7b7 (describing how a man from Berkeley, California
was fired for his participation in the white nationalist rally in Charlottesville).
207
See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
208
In light of the fact that the Charlottesville rally was brought about and facilitated
through online groups, Judkis supra note 206, this would not be the time to forget the
horrible, racially-motivated murders and lynchings that the KKK—in attendance at
Charlottesville—organized in the past, for which they gained their notoriety, see KU
KLUX KLAN: AMERICA’S FIRST TERRORISTS EXPOSED 210 (Patrick O’Donnell ed.,
2006).
209
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:14 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/635998754546548737 (“Jeb Bush is
crazy, who cares that he speaks Mexican, this is America, English !!”[sic]); Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 24, 2016, 7:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/713012045214531584 (“It is amazing
how often I am right, only to be criticized by the media. Illegal immigration, take the
oil, build the wall, Muslims, NATO!”); see also Jay A. Pearson, Trump is a Textbook
Racist, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017, 3:00 AM) http://www.latimes.com/opinion/oped/la-oe-pearson-trumps-textbook-racism-20171004-story.html (describing how
Trump’s “insensitive, disrespectful and mean-spirited statements and actions” fit
within the metric of various scholarly categories of racism); James Griffiths & Laura
Smith-Spark, ‘Shame on Trump!’ World Reacts to Trump’s ‘Shithole Countries’ Remarks,
CNN (Jan 12, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/12/politics/trumpshithole-countries-reaction-intl/index.html.
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See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of
transgender military personnel).
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Aaron Rupar, How Donald Trump Insulted His Way to the Top of the GOP,
THINKPROGRESS (May 4, 2016, 6:14 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/how-donaldtrump-insulted-his-way-to-the-top-of-the-gop-b5ab95b676ec/.
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See Following FAQs, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14019 (last
visited May 5, 2018).
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online have committed violent crimes.213 In those instances, the
connection to the original speaker seemed too oblique, and the
actions of the listener too disassociated from the speaker’s
intention to justify ascribing liability for the result.214 However,
the President of the United States is a uniquely powerful and
highly visible speaker. Running the full voltage of presidential
influence through Twitter is about as likely as one could imagine
to transmute Internet speech into real world action. Donald
Trump has the ear of the nation, and his speech over Twitter is
intended to foster agreement with his ideas and sentiments.215
There is an innately greater risk that people—be they foreign
leaders,216 U.S. military officials,217 or everyday citizens218—will
act based on his words as an authority figure. 219 As such,
presidential speech carries a greater risk of incitement, and social
media facilitates that potential for harm by extending the reach
of that speech to a greater number of people.
It is true that social media is increasingly becoming a
normal part of political campaigns and has been added to the
regular repertoire of means by which politicians speak to their
constituents. 220 That trend will surely continue, and a Twitter
213

See, e.g., Martha Smithey, School Shooters: The Progression from Social Rejection to
Mass Murder, in GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: CRIME, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 71 (Lisa A. Eargle & Ashraf Esmail eds., 2016 ) (“Loners and hate group
members use [the Internet] for bomb making instructions and information on the
acquisition of guns.”); Nicky Woolf, Slender Man: The Shadowy Online Figure Blamed
in Grisly Wisconsin Stabbing, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2014, 4:41 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/slender-man-online-characterwisconsin-stabbings;; Will Worley, YouTube Removing ‘Bump Stock’ Videos that Show
How to Make Guns Fire Faster after Las Vegas Shooting, INDEP. (Oct. 8, 2017, 8:55 PM),
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See discussion supra Section IV.D.
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Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2016),
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North Korean leadership to seemingly threatening tweets from President Trump).
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account or Facebook page will probably be a regular part of
future presidents’ official presence going forward. Because social
media will likely play a role in presidential speech in the future,
the Court should be wary of preventing it from naturally filling
that space. There is value in a President’s ability to reach as wide
an audience as possible, including people who do not have
televisions or cannot be home in time for the broadcast of a
presidential address, and social media provides that accessibility.
There is also value in the President keeping up with technology
and engaging with people where they usually congregate to
speak these days: online.221 However, with “Twitter town halls”
replacing “some typical presidential press interactions,” perhaps
there is a risk that “Twitter provides the veneer of populist
connection without the hassle of accountability” and the
President “can easily make himself available to anonymous fans
instead of the scrutiny of the press.”222 While use of social media
by the executive may have unique democratic benefits, its misuse
also poses unique dangers. Leaving room for the President to
utilize social media as a means of speaking to the people is not
mutually exclusive with drawing lines that circumscribe the
possible dangers native to his or her speech when amplified
through that medium.
V.

CONCLUSION

It may be that we are heading toward an era in which
Executive Orders issued over Twitter are par for the course. But
it is important for First Amendment jurisprudence to adjust for
the ways in which social media is different from what it has
encountered before, and for the ways in which executive speech
through that medium may be treading on very thin ice. Trump’s
actions have thrown into sharp relief the possible dangers of
executive speech conducted through social media. Twitter may
seem like a communication utopia for democratic discussion,223
and, in fact, Twitter is ostensibly grounded in such principles.224
That level of freedom, however, is not appropriate for the
President, whose most careless words have power—to change,
trigger, influence, incite. Presidential statements condoning
violence carry a greater likelihood of causing violence. For
221

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see also Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/socialmedia/.
222
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224
Twitter for Good, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/twitter-forgood.html (“We believe the open exchange of information can have a positive
impact on the world.”).
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example, even Trump’s failure to speak strongly against racism
and hate speech bolstered groups in the “alt-right.”225 The stakes
of presidential speech are too high for it to be treated casually,
even over Twitter.
Although Donald Trump’s presidency has provided some
dramatic illustrations, it is the attributes of the executive office
itself that make executive speech innately more dangerous. It
should, therefore, be subject—at least potentially—to heightened
First Amendment restrictions. If a President is inattentive to the
native risks and responsibilities of his or her position, the law
should draw the outer boundaries of executive freedom of speech
at a point where the harm the speech has the power to create can
be prevented, even if that means stopping short of the liberties
accorded to an ordinary citizen. That line should be drawn
cautiously, but will inevitably encroach further into the
President’s sphere of personal liberty than an average person,
whose speech has neither the same reach nor gravity.
The added dimension of social media should also alter
how the requirements of Brandenburg are assessed for presidential
speech. First Amendment jurisprudence may naturally evolve in
a more restrictive direction in reaction to the burgeoning of
internet communication, following the trellis along which
technology is growing, and surely the President’s speech would
be included in any such changes. However, the impact of social
media on presidential speech deserves special—and perhaps
swifter—attention. Wholesale destruction of the Brandenburg
principles226 may not be called for, but the dynamics of modern
communication make it clear that “immediacy” and
“likelihood” do not mean what they meant in 1969. 227 New
media carry communication faster and further than before, and
the distance from words in the palm of one’s hand to a clenched
fist may be shorter than it seems. Previously, one might interact
in person with a speaker with whom they disagreed, or spend
weeks composing a letter to the editor of their local newspaper
to respond. Now, people can fire back a comment almost
instantaneously, with no built-in time for reflection. Further,
with each individual moving within a personalized sphere of
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Because Trump’s response to the Charlottesville riot did not “rebuke white
nationalism by name[,] Nazi, alt-right and white supremacist groups . . . were
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information,228 people may be less likely to constructively engage
ideas with which they do not agree. The terrain of executive
speech through social media, likewise, is more treacherous in the
digital age. When it comes to assessing the danger of a potential
speaker’s words, the executive role and its social media mode of
transmission both counsel for a more restrictive speech standard.
Preserving a true, indiscriminate marketplace of ideas by
protecting the right of free speech to the greatest possible
extent—regardless of its content, repugnance, or cruelty—is a
noble goal, and standing on principle is certainly a proud legal
tradition. However, the purpose behind flooding the marketplace
with speech is distorted by social media.229 It re-routes speech
exclusively into the channels where people want to hear it: where
it already fits their ideals, 230 or perhaps justifies actions they
already wanted to take. In this way, the social media age is not
in sync with the thought processes and intentions that guided
past free speech decisions. The Internet throws open great
horizons of possibility for sharing ideas and for global
communication that seem to align with the hope of constructive
discussion.231 However, while the law is busy trying to fit social
media within historical concepts of speech regulation, it is not
acknowledging that some of the variables have changed.232 Great
risks are taken and sacrifices made in the name of democracy,
especially in the realm of free speech. It mirrors one of the classic
compromises—and difficult choices—made by the judicial
228
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232
Legal decisions operate by analogy, but while the Court wrestles with such
questions as what type of forum the Internet should be considered and whether true
threats can travel over Facebook, it is perhaps missing an elemental disjuncture
between the existing laws and the emerging problems those laws are struggling to
address. See Lidsky, supra note 36, at 155 (“Existing First Amendment doctrine are
not well tailored to address the harms of incendiary social media speech . . . and
perhaps they should not be.”).
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system: waiting for bodies to pile up on the courthouse steps
before we reassess whether we properly gauged the risks of our
chosen philosophy.
While Donald Trump’s presidency is bringing to light
manifold potential dangers of uninhibited presidential speech, it
raises broader questions that do not apply only to him, and will
not go away in the future. His words have taken us to the
treacherous outer reaches of free speech where, perhaps, we
should already have been reconsidering whether baseline First
Amendment boundaries really fit the modern executive. If the
President is the representative of the people, the embodiment of
how we think and act, then the judiciary is our conscience. The
separation of powers between the President and the Court 233
emphasizes respect for the challenges of executive office,
deference to the President as speaker for the people, and trust
that he or she will “faithfully execute”234 the duties of office. One
key part of our trust as a nation, however, stays with the Supreme
Court: the reliance on its function as a check on the President,
and the belief that it will speak if the President crosses the line
and leverages the power of his or her speech in a way that creates
violence, or does violence to our principles. To be true to the
principles of the Constitution and of the First Amendment, it is
necessary to adapt to the times, but it is also necessary to keep in
mind the balance within the government—and the dialogue
between the government and the people—that we are trying to
preserve in the face of a new and changing world.
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